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EAsT EURoPEAN CONSITUnTONAL REVIEW
The Pains of Growing Together:
The Case of the East-German Spies
David P Currie
Spying is a hoary and equivocal profession. The
ancient Egyptians developed a sophisticated system
of espionage; a Chinese treatise devoted an entire
chapter to the subject as early as 500 BC. Nathan
Hale became a hero in the United States by spying on
the British during the Revolutionary War, and the
British hanged him unceremoniously without trial.
Just a few weeks ago the German Constitutional
Court was called upon to decide what to do about
spies when the countries for and against which they
had worked became a single nation.1
The political branches of the Federal Republic
had given a dear answer. Klaus Kinkel, who had
directed espionage activities against East Germany,
became foreign minister. Markus Wolf, who had
engaged in similar activities against the West, was
tried for and convicted of treason. 2
The West, after all, won the Cold War.
The Constitutional Court saw it differently and
reversed the convictions of several high-ranking intel-
ligence officers of the former East German regime on
constitutional grounds.
If former adversaries are to live together in harmo-
ny, there is much to be said at the policy level for for-
giving past offenses.3 After the Civil War, President
Andrew Johnson issued a general amnesty for those
who had made war against the United States, includ-
ing Jefferson Davis, president of the so-called
Confederate States of America, who had been indicted
for treason.4 But as both the majority and the dis-
senters in the German decision pointed out, the nego-
tiators of the Unification Treaty and the Parliament of
the reunited nation had decisively rejected pleas for
amnesty for East German spies,5 and it was not so easy
to find such a requirement in the Constitution.
One is reminded, of course, of Nurnberg. Allied
trials of Nazi officials for alleged war crimes were
widely criticized as ex post facto, and Art. 1032 of the
German Basic Law provides in no uncertain terms
that "an act may be punished only if it was defined by
law as a criminal offense before the act was commit-
ted."6 But the Court rightly rejected any suggestion
that punishment of East German spies offended the
ex post facto provision; spying against West Germany
had always been a crime under West German law,
even if the offender never left East Germany.7
Nor did the Court conclude that spying was such
a respectable business that, like birdwatching, its
penalization inherently offended the constitutional
principle that punishment may be inflicted only
when the offender is guilty of some moral wrong
(Schuldprinzip).8 Prohibiting espionage, the opinion
conceded, served to promote the overriding interest in
protecting the free democratic order of the Federal
Republic, which alone made possible the enjoyment
of fundamental rights . The same considerations, the
Court said,justified extending punishment generally
to those who caused injury to West Germany by
directing espionage activities- from outside its bor-
ders-which as the Court added was fully consonant
with standard principles of international law.10
The Constitutional Court did not hold, as had
one of the courts below,11 that punishing East
German but not West German spies offended the
equality principle of Art. 3.1 of the Basic Law.12
That was certainly a plausible argument. Once
Germany became a single country, it was not clear
why it was any more reprehensible to have spied for
one of its component parts than for the other.1 3 For
the Court the decisive fact was that the Federal
Republic had survived and the Democratic
Republic had not: It was perfectly reasonable not to
prosecute one's own spies.14
Article 25 of the Basic Law makes international
law a part of German law and gives it precedence
over domestic statutes, but the Court explicitly
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denied that prosecution of East German spies was
contrary to international norms. 15
Finally, the Court did not hold that aflEast German
spies were immune from prosecution after unification.
Only East Germans who had confined their activities
to East Germany or to other countries where they were
safe from extradition were entitled to constitutional
protection. The big fish who pulled the strings were to
be left in freedom; the little fish who carried out their
orders could be put or kept behind bars. 16
The Court based its decision on the principle of
proportionality (Verhdlnmsfligkeit).17
The Basic Law says nothing about proportionality.
The doctrine has its roots in an eighteenth-century cod-
ification of Prussian law, which without purporting to
limit legislative competence authorized the administra-
tion (Poize) to take necessary measures (Se nthigen
Anstaten) to protect the public peace, order, and securi-
ty.18 The Constitutional Court from the first found it
an implicit constitutional limitation on the powers ofall
branches of government.19 Even those fundamental
rights which are subject to statutory restriction-such as
the right to freedom from bodily restraint guaranteed
by Art. 22-or which find their limits in "the constitu-
tional order"-ie., the general freedom of action ("a/ge-
meine Handrngsfreiheit") the Court has perceived in the
right to free development of personality protected by
Art. 2.120-are safe against any limitation that does not
pass the proportionality test.
Not surprisingly, there has been some uncertainty
as to where the proportionality requirement is found
in the Basic Law. The prevailing view is that it is one
aspect of the general principle of the rule of law
(Rechtsstaat),21 which itself (insofar as the central
authorities are concerned) is merely implicit in the
various structural provisions of Art. 20.2
Proportionality is the German counterpart of the
American doctrine of substantive due process.23
As the Court said in the present case, the propor-
tionality test has three parts. Any limitation of funda-
mental rights must be adapted (eeignet) to the attain-
ment of a legitimate purpose, necessary (erforderich) to
that end, and not overly burdensome (unzumutbar) in
comparison to the benefits to be achieved.24
The Court had no difficulty with the first two
requirements, which are concerned with the rela-
tion between ends and means: punishment for spy-
ing was the only way to achieve the statutory goaL
It was the third prong of the test, the relation
between costs and benefits (sometimes referred to
as "proportionality in the narrower sense) on
which the spy prosecutions foundered.25
East German spies, the Court acknowledged, had
offended West German law; but they were safe from
prosecution, both practically and legally, so long as
they remained in the East.2 6 Against persons in that
protected position, said the Court, the West German
laws could have little deterrent effect; to subject them
to proceedings made possible only because unification
had extended the Federal Republic's authority would
impose upon them a particularly heavy burden.27
The fact that West German spies escaped punish-
ment for similar activities, while not enough to offend
the equality provision, enhanced the harshness
(Schd fe) of this burden; and it was detrimental to the
unification process to continue to treat East Germany
for this purpose as a foreign state.28 Any remaining
contribution of such prosecutions to national security,
the Court concluded, was "clearly outweighed" by
these considerations.29
Three dissenting Justices argued that the Court
had undervalued the interest in national security-,
prosecution would help to deter both others and the
defendants themselves from committing further acts
of espionage against the Federal Republic.30 There is
little profit in haggling here over who had the better
of this debate, for we have left the domain of legal
analysis. Whether one interest outweighs another is
an essentially political decision on which reasonable
minds obviously can differ, and they did.
Precisely therein lies the dissenters' principal
objection. Whether to grant a general amnesty, they
argued, was a political decision to be made by the
political branches of government; the Court had
overstepped the boundary between judicial and leg-
islative authority.31
But the distinction between adjudication and leg-
islation always blurs when a court undertakes to
determine whether a policy decision is arbitrary, or
disproportionate, or unreasonable. It is the essence of
constitutional doctrines like these that courts retrace
the same paths of decision that the political branches
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have followed, giving more or less deference to their
conclusions. We have seen this in the United States
with decisions striking down legislative attempts to
prohibit slavery, to limit working hours, and to forbid
abortion.32 The German Court is no stranger to this
process; its reports are studded with cases second-
guessing legislative judgments, in matters ranging
from sex-change operations and limitation of the
number of drugstores to the romantic question of
hunting with falcons .33
The dissenters did not challenge the proportion-
ality principle itself; they argued that it had been
misapplied. Prior decisions, they said, suggested that
proportionality should be determined case by case,
not for a whole category of persons; and the only
factors that could properly be weighed against the
interest in security were a diminished degree of
blameworthiness and the possibility that sanctions
might no longer serve their purpose.34 And of
course the dissenters added that the majority had
not given sufficient deference to the views of the
political branches .35
My own reading of earlier proportionality cases
in the Constitutional Court does not suggest any very
high degree of deference to legislative or executive
conclusions.3 6 Nor does there appear to be any short-
age of precedent for the Court's authority to find that
political decisions offend the proportionality principle
as to whole classes of people.37 As a historical matter
there seems to be more to the dissenters' objection that
extraneous factors such as the effect of spy prosecu-
tions on the integration process ought not to be con-
sidered, for conventional statements of the propor-
tionality principle speak of balancing the interests
served by a challenged measure against the burden it
places upon the complaining parties?8
It is typical ofjudges to discover that constitutions
that appear to be silent on the subject give them
power to strike down unreasonable legislative or exec-
Notes:
1 - BVerfG, Decision of May 15, 1995, Case
Nos 2 BvL 19/91 et al (not yet officially reported).
2 See New York TimesJune 6,1995, Section A,
p 11. Treason is commonly limited to betraying
one's own country, but the German definition
utive actions. It is also typical for them to look for for-
mulas that limit, or ostensibly limit, the discretionary
nature of their decisions. Thus the US Supreme
Court in administering its homemade doctrine of sub-
stantive due process tends to hedge it about with legal-
istic categories like "fundamental rights" or businesses
"affected with a public interest,"39 and the
Constitutional Court divides proportionality into
three parts, the last of which the dissenters in the spy
case insisted should be interpreted narrowly. For, as
the dissenting justices observed, the more open-ended
the constitutional standard becomes, the harder it is to
distinguish what the judges do from that which is
done by those to whom the Constitution entrusts the
task of making policy; and the harder it is to explain
why it is appropriate for it to be done by politically
irresponsiblejudges in a democracy.
The difficulty is compounded when, as is the case
with substantive due process in the United States and
proportionality in the Federal Republic, thej udges are
applying principles that they themselves have read
into the Constitution. For what Justice Byron White
said not long ago about the Supreme Court of the
United States is equally true of courts in other coun-
tries blessed with a republican form of government
"The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitu-
tional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution."4° The East
German spy decision was by no means the first to
raise this question in Germany, and it will surely not
be the last. But one may perhaps be forgiven for won-
dering whether, whatever good it may have done in
the individual case, such a decision will serve in the
long run to strengthen or to weaken the crucial insti-
tution ofjudicial review.
David P Currie is Edward IL Levi Distinguished Service
Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law &hooL
extends to anyone who reveals state secrets to a
foreign power, § 94.1 StGB (the criminal code).
The charges against Wolf and against the parties
to the cases before the Constitutional Court also
included violations of § 99.1 StGB, which forbids
espionage against the Federal Republic on behalf
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of any foreign power.Wolf himself was not a party
to those cases; his appeal to the Federal Court of
Justice was pending at the time of the
Constitutional Court's decision. See Siiddeutsche
Zeitung, May 26, 1995, p 4.
3 See dissenting opinion of Justices Klein,
Kirchhof and Winter at 14-15.
4 6 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the
Presidents 708 (Dec 25, 1868). See generally
Jonathan Truman Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty Under
Lincoln and Johnson (North Carolina, 1953).
5 See slip opinion at 11-13; dissenting opinion at 1.
6 Arguably this provision permits prosecution
for acts that violated generally accepted principles
of international law, which Art. 25 makes a part of
German law; but spying is not an offense against
international law. See slip opinion at 66.
7 See id at 60-63; § S 5.4, 9.1 94.1, 99.1 StGB.
8 See 20 BVerfGE 323, 330-36 (1966); 45
BVerfGE 187,228 (1977). See also slip opinion at 66:
"Generally the state imposes criminal sanctions on
activities that fall short of an ethical minimum."
9 Id at 51-53. See also 57 BVerfGE 250, 262 ff
(1981); 28 BVerfGE 175, 183 ff (1970).
10 Slip opinion at 63. These principles are con-
ventional learning in the United States. See
Restatement Third, Foreign Relations, § 402.c (1987)
(affirming that, subject to certain exceptions, a state
has legislative jurisdiction with respect to "conduct
outside its territory that has or is intended to have sub-
stantial effect within its territory"); cf Restatement,
Conflict of Laws, S 377 (1934): "The place of wrong
is in the state where the last event necessary to make
an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."
11 See slip opinion at 22-23. See also the argu-
ment of counsel in id at 31-32.
12 "All persons shall be equal before the law."
13 See slip opinion at 66 (noting that internation-
al law draws no distinction between spying for good
states and spying for bad ones.) Of course there may
have been differences in the methods employed by East
and West German spies that mightjustify differential
treatment, but the charges before the Court were based
on the generic act of spying. See id at 23, 67-68.
14 See id at 53-54.
15 See id at 55-59.
16 See dissenting opinion at 26, 28-29 (under-
standably suggesting that this distinction itself raised a
serious problem under the equality clause).
17 See slip opinion at 62.
18 Algemeines Landrecht far die Preufischen
Staaten, pt II, tit 17, § 10 (1794).
19 See, e.g., 2 BVerfGE 266,280-81 (1953).
20 6 BVerfGE 32,36-37 (1957) (Eqfes). See David
P. Currie, The Constution of the Fera! Repubkc of
Germany 316-17 (1994).
21 See e.g., slip opinion at 62.
22 The constituent states (LAnder), on the other
hand, are expressly required to conform to the
Rechtsstaat principle. See Art. 28.1 GG. For a more
detailed look at the Rechtsstaat and proportionality
principles see Currie, The Constitution of the Federal
Republic ofGermany at 18-20, 307-09 (cited in note 20).
23 See id. at 274-75,305-21.
24 See slip opinion at 63.
25 Id.
26 See id. at 68-69 (noting that East Germany
would not extradite its own spies and that the 1972
treaty between the two Germanies, by requiring
each state to respect the autonomy of the other, for-
bade West German authorities to take action in East
Germany).
27 "Durch so eine Strqaferfolgung werden sie in beson-
derem Mafle betroffen." Id. at 70.
28 Id. at 71
29 Id. at 73. The balance of interests was different,
the Court added, for those who had acted within the
original Federal Republic or in a third state that did not
protect their activities, for they could have had no
expectation of immunity from apprehension and thus
were more susceptible to deterrence. The permissibili-
ty of punishing them, the Court said, would have to be
determined by balancing the competing interests case
by case. Id. at 70, 75-77 (suggesting also that in some
cases their offenses may have been more serious).
30 See dissenting opinion at 2, 11-12 (noting
that it would also serve the interest in retribution
for past offenses). On the other side of the bal-
ance, the dissenters added, with considerable
force, the defendants' reliance on the continued
existence of a separate East German state to insu-
late them from prosecution was not worthy of
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constitutional protection. Id at 6-7, 22-23.
31 Id. at 1, 14, 33.
32 Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US 393 (1857);
Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905); Roe v
Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
33 49 BVerfGE 286 (1979); 7 BVerfGE 377
(1958); 55 BVerfGE 159 (1980).
34 See dissenting opinion at 3, 7-9. The dissenters
conceded, however, that the consequences of unifica-
tion might require some amelioration in applying
criminal provisions to individual East German agents.
Id. at 26-28, 31-32.
35 Id. at 24.
36 See Currie, The Constitution of the Federal
Republic ofGermany, chapter 6 (cited in note 20).
37 The famous falconry case, cited in note 33, is
only one of many examples.
38 This is how it was put, for example, in the
recent decision, 90 BVerfGE 145, 185-92 (1994),
invoked by the dissenters at p. 8 of their opinion, in
which the Court laid down criteria for determining
when punishment for possession of small amounts of
marijuana would impose a disproportionate burden.
It is also consistent with the original formulation of
the doctrine. See Carl Gottlieb Svarez, Vortrdge fiber
Recht und Staat 486-87 (Hermann Conrad & Gerd
Kleinheyer, eds, 1960). Indeed the prevailing opinion
in the spy case itself twice said the test was whether
the means employed would lead to an undue intru-
sion upon the rights of the affected party. See slip opin-
ion id. at 63, 64.
39 See Roe v Wade, 410 US at 154, 162-64;
Munn v Illinois, 94 US 113,126 (1887).
40 Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186,194 (1986).
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